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Freedman: Professional Discipline of Prosecutors: A Response to Professor Z

PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE OF PROSECUTORS:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR ZACHARIAS
Monroe H. Freedman*
In a recent article, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors,'
Professor Fred C. Zacharias reports the results of an empirical study he
has conducted of disciplinary actions against prosecutors. Based on a
computer search of reported cases, he concludes that there is an "overall
trend of infrequent [disciplinary] prosecutions," suggesting "neglect or
sloth" on the part of the authorities,3 and he properly calls for more
effective use of professional discipline of prosecutors.
Professor Zacharias also notes that "judges ... need some
reeducation" regarding the effectiveness and adequacy of professional
discipline to discourage prosecutorial abuse.' For example, in Imbler v.
Pachtman, the Supreme Court referred to the existence of professional
discipline as a ground for immunizing prosecutors from legal action for

* Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, Hofstra University School
of Law.
I. Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REv. 721
(2001).
2. See generally iL at 743-55 (reporting the results of the study which was conducted by
examining reported cases of prosecutorial discipline).
3. Id. at 774.
4. See id. at 774-77. Zacharias calls for a "proactive approach to discipline." Id. at 774. Such
an approach might require the bar to "amend[] the[ir] regulatory regime." Id. at 775. For example,
he argues that "[d]isciplinary agencies should assign staff to review media reports of prosecutions
that refer to potentially questionable prosecutorial conduct ... and to review local court opinions
that identify prosecutorial misconduct." Id. at 774 (citing Richard A. Rosen, DisciplinarySanctions
Against Prosecutorsfor Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697, 735-36
(1987)). Additionally, Zacharias argues that the bar should develop internal guidelines to serve as
standards for resource allocation issues when potential cases arise. See id. Zacharias also calls for
disciplinary authorities to "embrace bar action" when it is found that professional discipline is
needed. Id. at 775.
5. Id. at 777 (arguing that judges must be made aware that "[b]ar authorities do not, and
probably cannot, fill the void in prosecutorial oversight across the board").
6. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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depriving citizens of their constitutional rights.7 As Professor Zacharias
says, however, it is unrealistic to rely on discipline alone to discourage
prosecutors from this kind of unprofessional conduct.8
In reaching these conclusions, Professor Zacharias is reiterating
what a number of authorities have been saying for many years.9 Indeed,
his research could fairly be summarized as follows: Numerous
authorities on prosecutorial ethics and discipline have maintainedfor
many years that prosecutors are far too infrequently subjected to
professional discipline and that courts cannot responsibly defer to
disciplinary authorities to oversee prosecutorial misconduct that
deprives individuals offundamental rights. The new research discussed
in this article demonstrates that these authorities have been right all
along.10
That is not, though, what Professor Zacharias does. Instead of
saying simply and directly that his empirical research confirms what
numerous scholars have been saying for many years, Professor Zacharias
seems to be at pains to make his research appear to differ significantly
from the work of previous commentators in its conclusions as well as in
its methodology." As a result, there is much in Professor Zacharias'
article that might actually serve to discourage more effective use of
professional discipline of prosecutors and also to reinforce the fallacy
that courts can responsibly defer to professional disciplinary committees
to deal with prosecutorial misconduct like suppressing evidence and
presenting false testimony. 2
For example, Professor Zacharias disparages most of the previous
commentators by saying that their "traditional lamentations" are
"somewhat overblown,"'13 and that their observations are "tinged with an
element of handwringing" as they "bemoan" the failure of disciplinary
7. See id. at 428-29 & n.30 (stating that prosecutorial immunity from liability in civil suits
under § 1983 does not leave the public without recourse to censure prosecutorial misconduct
because prosecutors are subject to "professional discipline by an association of [their] peers"
pursuant to the ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility).
8. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 777 (arguing that the professional bar is probably unable to
serve as the primary discipliner of prosecutorial misconduct).
9. See id. at 722 n.3 (listing commentators who have reacted to the Supreme Court's
decision in Imbler to immunize prosecutors from civil liability by noting the virtual absence of cases
where prosecutors were sanctioned by disciplinary authorities).
10. See id. at 743-55 (concluding that the results of the study revealed that prosecutors are
infrequently, but not "never," disciplined by either professional authorities or the courts).
11. See id. at 743-48 & nn.77-85.
12. See infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
13. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 778 (concluding that although commentators' criticisms of the
failure of professional authorities to discipline prosecutorial misconduct are exaggerated, the
criticisms do contain a large amount of truth).
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authorities "to do their jobs."' 4 By contrast, he claims that his own article
"approaches the issue of discipline of prosecutors from an impartial
the matter "realistically"'"
perspective," suggesting
6 that he alone assesses
and "dispassionately."'
More important, at a number of points Professor Zacharias makes
assertions that could give false comfort to those who oppose more
effective discipline of prosecutors and to those judges who prefer to
defer to disciplinary authorities to oversee prosecutorial abuse. For
example, he claims that his own research "dispels at least one myth: that
prosecutors are never disciplined."' 7 That strong language contains a
serious inaccuracy, and could convey a misleading impression. The
inaccuracy is that no one to my knowledge has ever stated the "myth"
that "prosecutors are never disciplined." That is, the "myth" that he
claims to "dispel" is nonexistent. What commentators have in fact been
saying is that prosecutors are far too seldom disciplined, especially for
unethical conduct that violates defendants' fundamental rights.'
Moreover, although Professor Zacharias does not acknowledge it, that
conclusion is actually reinforced by his computerized search for all
reported disciplinary cases. 9
Indeed, in his effort to dispel the alleged myth created by previous
scholars, Professor Zacharias asserts that although discipline of
prosecutors is "far from staggering," nevertheless, "in appropriate cases,
courts and disciplinary organizations sometimes have been willing to
address prosecutorial misconduct." 2 Indeed, he contends, disciplinary
authorities have "targeted particularly serious prosecutorial misconduct"
as well as "cases in which private clients are affected and public
14. Id. at 723 (stating that many authorities have reacted to the Court's justification for
immunizing prosecutors by citing to the paucity of cases where prosecutors have been sanctioned by
professional authorities).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 778.
17. Id. at 744.
18. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987) (asserting that, even though
Disciplinary Rules that prohibit prosecutorial suppression and/or falsification of evidence are in
effect in all fifty states, "disciplinary charges have been brought infrequently and meaningful
sanctions rarely applied"); Kenneth Rosenthal, ProsecutorMisconduct, Convictions, and Double
Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence,71 ThMP. L. REV. 887, 889 (1998) (stating
that there exists "a notable absence of disciplinary sanctions against prosecutors, even in the most
egregious cases").
19. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 744-45 (noting that many of the reported cases of
prosecutorial discipline are old and the number of reported cases is "far from staggering" when
compared to the number of criminal cases prosecuted).
20. Id.
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remedies are unlikely to address the prosecutor's behavior., 21
Unfortunately, those contentions-which are actually contradicted by
Professor Zacharias' study-could lead to an undesirable complacency
on the part of disciplinary authorities and judges.
The study consisted of a computerized review by a research
assistant seeking all reported cases involving disciplinary actions against
prosecutors.22 What the assistant came up with was something over one
hundred cases.23 Considering the multitude of federal and state
prosecutions in a year, one hundred disciplinary cases a year would not
only be far from staggering, but, in my opinion, would be far from
adequate. On the other hand, one hundred cases in a ten-year period
would be staggeringly inadequate.
But what if the researchers were able to find only one hundred
cases in more than a century-fewer, that is, than one a year? Would
that dispel any myths about inadequate discipline of prosecutorial
misconduct? I raise the question because Professor Zacharias' research
went back at least to 1886-a fact one learns only by reading a
footnote.2 In the text, the reader is told only that "many of the cases are
old," with no indication of how very old they are.2
Disregarding his own data, Professor Zacharias concludes that "in
appropriate cases, courts and disciplinary organizations sometimes have
been willing to address prosecutorial misconduct. ' 26 When "sometimes"
translates into less than once a year-nationwide, federal and state, and
including cases of bribery, extortion, conversion, and embezzlement of
state funds-why not simply say, straight out, that the research confirms
the general view of scholars that prosecutors are far too seldom
subjected to professional discipline for unethically abusing the rights of
citizens?27 Indeed, it is striking, in an article replete with charts and
statistics, that Professor Zacharias never says in so many words that his
research produced less than one case a year.

21. Id. at 774.
22. See id. at 744 n.80 (describing the instructions given to the research assistants).
23. See id. at 744. Professor Zacharias does not say how many cases over one hundred, so I
infer that the number wasn't enough to matter significantly.
24. See id. at 745 n.86. The case referred to is In re Cowdery, 10 P. 47 (Cal. 1886) (en banc).
This case is one of nine involving bribery. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 745 n.86. Others in the
one hundred included extortion, conversion, and embezzlement, which is not the kind of case that
critics have been lamenting about. See id. at 745-46 & nn.87-89.
25. Id. at 744.
26. Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to
Include the Non-AdversarialRoles of FederalProsecutors,37 B.C. L. REv. 923, 963 (1996).
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Professor Zacharias might respond that the careful reader will not
misinterpret or misuse what he has said. But all readers are not careful
(and some read with a partisan eye). Indeed, Professor Zacharias himself
has interpreted his own data to mean that there are a "fair" number of
cases of professional discipline against prosecutors.s A conclusion that
there are already a "fair" number of disciplinary cases is not likely to
inspire more vigorous efforts by disciplinary authorities or a more
realistic attitude on the part of judges. And if Professor Zacharias can so
easily mischaracterize his own findings, it is likely that others will do
so as well.
Also, in the course of providing justifications for the failure of
disciplinary committees to discipline prosecutors more frequently,
Professor Zacharias gives some reasons that are subject to question, and
that could also discourage disciplinary action against prosecutors. He
says, for example, that prosecutors who engage in the kind of
misconduct decried in the cases and literature are typically "driven by an
excess of zeal in pursuing the public good" and not, typically, for
reasons of personal gain."
A laudable motive like pursuing the public good should, of course,
weigh against disciplinary action against any lawyer. Particularly
coming from one who favors empirical research, however, the
conclusion as to what "typically" motivates unethical prosecutors is a
questionable one. Some of us, for example, have seen overzealous
prosecutors motivated, at least in part, by career ambitions," such as
advancement to district attorney, judge, governor, senator, and even
President; others have been motivated by a desire to gain experience,
contacts, and public attention as credentials for a switch to a lucrative
28. See Audio tape: Ethics in Criminal Advocacy, Annual Meeting, held by Association of
American Law Schools (Jan. 6,2000) (on file with Author).
29. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 757. Professor Zacharias offers other justifications for
infrequent discipline of prosecutors, including the availability of alternative remedies such as the
appellate reversal of convictions, see id. at 758; the desire to avoid extensive litigation regarding the
substantive basis of the prosecutor's legal theory where a new legal argument regarding a statutory
or constitutional principle is at issue, see id. at 760; and a concern by disciplinary committees to
avoid any infringement upon the separation of powers, since prosecutors are arguably members of
the executive branch, while bar authorities usually operate under the rubric of the judiciary branch,
see id. at 761.
30. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 CoLuM. L. REv. 2030,
2124 n.231 (2000) (discussing instances where overzealous prosecutors' careers advanced after
prosecutorial misconduct was committed); Penny J. White, Errorsand Ethics: Dilemmas in Death,
29 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1265, 1280 & n.104 (2001) (stating that several prosecutors, whose conduct
was described by an Illinois Appellate Court as "'[ilnexcusable' and "'[a]n insult to the court and
to the dignity of the bar,"' all "received promotions within their offices and now serve as judges")
(alterations in original)).
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job in private practice. 3' Also, one might question whether a
commentator is as "impartial" and "dispassionate" as he claims when he
presumes a pro bono motive when prosecutors suppress evidence or use
false testimony. 2 One wonders whether Professor Zacharias is aware of
the recent scandals involving prosecutorial suppression of evidence in
cases-even in death penalty cases-in which the defendants have been
found to have been innocent in fact.33
Similarly, Professor Zacharias asserts flatly in the text of his article
that judicial opinions citing prosecutorial misconduct sometimes have
"proven" to be no more than "literary exaggerations." 34 Again, only a
careful reader of footnotes will find an acknowledgment that the proof
that is unequivocally asserted in the text is in fact scant and far less than
compelling.35
Further, Professor Zacharias suggests that there may be less
discipline of prosecutors than of lawyers representing private clients
because of the "lesser need ... in order to protect individuals."3
However, every citizen who is convicted unjustly because of suppressed
evidence or false testimony is an individual seriously in need of
protection, no less than the victim of, say, solicitation (which is a
favorite of bar authorities).37
In short, then, it would have been far better, even if less dramatic, if
Professor Zacharias had simply reported that his research confirms that
the conventional wisdom has been right all along-that prosecutors are
far too seldom subjected to professional discipline, even for serious

31. Cf Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor,The Press,and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 865, 888-89 (1990) (stating that "secur[ing] private sector legal employment and clients
sometime in the future" is an economic motive for prosecutors to comment on cases outside the
courtroom).
32. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 757 & n.123. Elaborating on his theme of pro bono
prosecutorial misconduct, Professor Zacharias offers the following apologia:
Mhe offending prosecutors typically engage in misconduct... because they are seeking
to convict defendants they honestly believe should be convicted. Although such
misconduct may be improper in light of the prosecutor's broad obligation to do overall
justice, the misconduct occurs because of the prosecutor's misunderstanding of the
nature of that role.
Id. at 757 n.123.
33. See Liebman, supra note 30, at 2110-11 (arguing that the Supreme Court's standard for
releasing exculpatory evidence encourages prosecutors to suppress evidence, thereby causing the
"overproduction of death").
34. Zacharias, supranote 1, at 759.
35. Seeid. at759n.132.
36. Id.at758.
37.

See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcs 237-65

(1990) (justifying solicitation in the interest of potential clients).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss1/3

6

Freedman: Professional Discipline of Prosecutors: A Response to Professor Z
2001]

A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR ZACHARJAS

127

violations of their ethical obligations in the administration of justice. As
shown in the beginning of this response, Professor Zacharias does that,
in effect and in part. Unfortunately, however, much of his article is also
dedicated to inaccurate and misleading assertions that suggest the
contrary, and to questionable justifications for the failure to discipline
prosecutors for unethical conduct. For those reasons, there is ground for
concern that Professor Zacharias' article could encourage disciplinary
authorities and judges to remain complacent about an extremely serious
ethical problem in the administration of criminal justice.
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